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<p>Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy</p>	
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This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed


Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs

[Philipp Markert](#), Daniel V. Bailey, Maximilian Golla, Markus Dürmuth, and Adam J. Aviv


Overview



Why study PINs?



User Study




Results

Why PINs?



Fingerprint



Face




PHOTO: Dan Seifert | The Verge (Vox Media)

Iris

Who uses PINs?


1220 participants

461 do not use a biometric



210 use a PIN

759 use a biometric



595 use a PIN

Overall 805 (66%) use a PIN

What we know about PINs

- User chosen 4-digit PINs are predictable [1]
- User chosen 6-digit PINs aren't any better [2]
- Blacklisting popular PINs can increase security [1]


What we don't know

- How secure are 4- or 6-digit PINs in the smartphone unlock setting?
- What are the effects of different blacklists on the security of PINs?
- How to balance security and usability when composing a blacklist?

[1] J. Bonneau, S. Preibusch, and R. Anderson. **A Birthday Present Every Eleven Wallets?** The Security of Customer-Chosen Banking PINs. FC '12

[2] D. Wang, Q. Gu, X. Huang, and P. Wang. **Understanding Human-Chosen PINs:** Characteristics, Distribution and Security. AsiaCCS '17

Treatments



Placebo

“Test general effect of warning”

Blacklist:

- “1st choice” blocked
- Any other PIN allowed

iOS

“Test effect of iOS blacklists”

Blacklist:



- 274 PINs (4-digit)
- 2910 PINs (6-digit)

Data-Driven (DD)



“Test effect of different blacklist sizes”

Blacklist:


- Top 27 PINs of Amitay (small)
- Top 2740 PINs of Amitay (large)



User Study




User Study



Attacker Model



- No information about the victim



Attacker Model



- No information about the victim

1 
2 
3 

- Guesses PINs in decreasing probability order

Rank	4-digit PINs	6-digit PINs
1	1234	123456
2	0000	123123
3	2580	111111
⋮	⋮	⋮

Attacker Model




- No information about the victim



- Guesses PINs in decreasing probability order



- Slowed down by rate-limiting



	Android	iOS
10 Guesses	30s	1h 36m 0s
100 Guesses	10h 45min 30s	—

Attacker Model



- No information about the victim



- Guesses PINs in decreasing probability order



- Slowed down by rate-limiting



- Knows the blacklist and skips impossible choices

Rank	4-digit PINs	6-digit PINs
1	1234	123456
2	0000	
3	2580	
⋮	⋮	

not allowed

This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed

Your PIN will be used to unlock your smartphone and to protect access to your data.

[Change PIN](#)

Research Questions

4 vs. 6

RQ1: How secure are 4- and 6-digit PINs in the smartphone unlock setting?


Small?
Medium?
Large?

RQ2: What are the effects of different blacklists on the security of PINs?



RQ3: How to balance security and usability when composing a blacklist?



RQ1: 4- vs. 6-digit PINs



Observations:


- Overall comparable security of 4- and 6-digit PINs in the defined attacker model
- Differences depending on the number of guesses

RQ2: Different Blacklist Sizes




Observations:

- *iOS* and *Data-Driven Small* offer comparable security
- *Data-Driven Large* drastically increases the security
- Blacklist Hitrate:




RQ3: Balancing Security and Usability




Observations:

- Different extrema throughout the curve
- Maxima: users choose popular PINs
- Minima: users choose unpopular PINs
- Blacklisting ~10% is ideal


Takeaways



Why study PINs?



User Study



Results

✉ philipp.markert@rub.de 🐦 @philipp_markert 🌐 <https://this-pin-can-be-easily-guessed.github.io>